Fundraising and competition of NGOs in three tiers non-profit supply chain with leverages of investment and donation

In recent years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have faced increasing challenges, including unstable financial resources, intensified competition for funds, government regulations, and issues related to public perception and trust. As a result, improving the efficiency and decision-making mechanisms of NGOs has become an important and widely discussed research topic. To address these challenges, NGOs must adopt effective strategies for resource acquisition and allocation. Among these strategies, fundraising operations play a critical role in securing financial resources. The financial resources of NGOs are typically allocated to two major types of activities: operational and campaigning activities, referred to in this study as leverage donation and leverage investment, respectively. Leverage investment includes activities such as organizing advocacy and protest campaigns to influence government policies, increasing public awareness of NGO missions, enhancing fundraising capacity, and investing in infrastructure to improve societal welfare. In contrast, leverage donation focuses on direct support activities, including identifying disadvantaged individuals and providing immediate financial and humanitarian assistance. Achieving an appropriate balance between leverage investment and leverage donation is essential for optimizing NGO decision-making and enhancing societal satisfaction. This paper investigates a non-profit supply chain consisting of two competing NGOs operating across two distinct segments, each supported by heterogeneous donor groups. To address the aforementioned challenges, each NGO develops two internal leverages corresponding to public-sector and private-sector activities. We model the interaction among NGOs, donors, and internal levers through a game-theoretic framework, in which NGOs compete under Nash equilibrium to determine optimal fundraising efforts and societal satisfaction levels. The proposed model determines the optimal allocation of resources between the two levers, the optimal fundraising effort, and the resulting equilibrium outcomes. Competition among NGOs is driven by activities that generate societal satisfaction, which in turn influences donor utility and willingness to contribute. Each NGO strategically adjusts its fundraising and satisfaction efforts to attract donors across segments, aiming to enhance financial sustainability while serving disadvantaged communities. The results show that increased fundraising intensity across segments is positively correlated with societal satisfaction in both channels. However, beyond certain levels, the effectiveness of leveraged donations slightly decreases, while the utility of competing levers increases. This outcome is primarily driven by the prioritization of meeting fundamental societal needs. Overall, the findings provide valuable insights into NGO financial decision-making and highlight the complex interrelationships among donors, NGOs, internal levers, and society within a non-profit supply chain context.